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SYMBOLIC UNION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Stark v. St. Cloud State University'
In the modern era of establishment clause2 jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has struggled to develop an analysis which is coherent in application
and reasonably predictable in result. In the landmark decision Everson v.
Board of Education,3 the Court was faced with the issue of allegedly unconsti-
tutional state aid to parochial schools. 4 In an effort to interpret the establish-
ment clause and thereby discover the applicable principles, Justice Black
stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.'
Later, the Supreme Court formulated a two pronged analysis incorporat-
ing much of Black's interpretation.6 The challenged state action or law vio-
lated the establishment clause unless it was secular in purpose and did not
have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.' The present
establishment clause analysis includes these two prongs plus an additional test
which prohibits state actions or laws that excessively entangle the church and
state." However, the statement of the analysis has not brought certainty in
1. 802 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson ushered in the modern era of establishment clause
jurisprudence. The modern era is characterized by the increased willingness of the
Court to review state action for establishment clause violations, and the great mental
energy expended by members of the Court to discover the meaning of the clause and to
develop legal principles for its application.
4. Frequently, as in Stark, the establishment clause controversy centers around
state aid to, and involvement with, church sponsored educational institutions.
5. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
6. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
7. Id.
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The three pronged analysis
set forth in Lemon is often referred to as the Lemon test. For purposes of clarity, the
three pronged analysis will be referred to as the Lemon analysis. Throughout this Note,
the three prongs will be referred to, respectively, as the secular purpose test, the pri-
mary (or principal) effect test and the excessive entanglement test. A subpart of any of
the three prongs will be referred to as an element.
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application or result.' For instance, the primary effect test now has a signifi-
cant new element which is not necessarily suggested by the statement of the
test.10 The importance of the symbolic union element in establishment clause
jurisprudence is evidenced by its application in the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Stark v. St. Cloud State University.',
In Stark, the court struck down a state university policy allowing univer-
sity students to fulfill their student teaching requirements at nonpublic schools
as violative of the establishment clause. In so doing, the court illustrated the
power of the symbolic union element of the primary effect test as a tool for
federal review of state action.1 2 Additionally, the decision shows how sensitive
the result in establishment clause cases can be to subjective characterizations18
of the facts of each case or minor factual variations between cases.1 ' This
Note will explore what possibility there is, if any, of formulating a similar
policy that would pass constitutional muster.
St. Cloud State University (the University) adopted a policy which al-
lowed students to fulfill their student teaching requirements at private or paro-
chial schools selected by the university. The policy, as summarized by the
court of appeals provided that:
9. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). "These tests constitute a conven-
ient, accurate distillation of this Court's efforts to evaluate [establishment clause chal-
lenges to government action].... It is well to emphasize, however, that the tests must
not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but
serve only as guidelines." Id. at 358-59. "Although simple to state, the three-prong
Lemon test presents difficult questions of interpretation and application." Stark, 802
F.2d at 1049. "[N]either affirmance nor reversal of any of these cases follows automat-
ically from the spar[s]e language of the First Amendment, from its history, or from the
cases of this Court construing it and.., reasonable men can very easily and sensibly
differ over the import of that language." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662(1970) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
11. 802 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1986).
12. For an explanation of symbolic union, see infra text accompanying note 41.
13. An example of this sensitivity is reflected in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668(1984). In Lynch, the issue was the constitutionality of displaying a municipal owned
nativity scene on public property. The majority characterized the display of the cr6eche
as part of the seasonal display which simply recognized the historical origins of the
publicly recognized holiday. Id. at 680. The dissent, which garnered four votes, insisted
the cr6che had to be singled out for its religious significance and constituted state en-
dorsement of Christianity. Id. at 705-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. For an example of how the result may differ because of a small difference in
facts, see McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952). These cases involved "release time" programs in which public
school students were released from their regular classes to spend time in religious
study. The only fundamental difference between the two was that in the former pro-
gram, which was struck down, the religion classes were held on the school grounds,
while in the latter program, which was upheld, the classes were off the school grounds.
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205; Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308. If this was a major difference,
its significance escaped Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in McCollum
and dissented in Zorach.
[Vol. 53
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[P]rivate and parochial schools can become student teacher sites if they meet
the criteria of public schools. A student can, at his or her option, be placed at
a private or parochial school selected by the University to participate in its
student teaching program .... [T]he University must advise those students
placed at parochial schools that the student's participation in any religious
aspect of the school is exclusively between the parochial school's personnel
and the student teacher. Further, the University will provide accommodation
for any of its student teaching supervisors who, based on religious grounds,
object to on-site visits to a private or parochial school." '
This policy was challenged as violative of the establishment clause.16 Such
a challenge invokes the now familiar three prong analysis of Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 7 which provides that in order for a state policy or program to survive an
establishment clause challenge it must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2) not have
the primary or principle effect of establishing religion; and 3) not excessively
entangle the state with the church."8
The first prong of the Lemon analysis seldom poses a substantial barrier
to a state program or policy.' 9 In Stark, however, it was with some difficulty
that the court found the stated purpose to be secular. The University stated
that the purpose of including the parochial schools in its student teaching pro-
gram was to increase the number of available student teaching sites.20 Al-
though the court found this to be a secular purpose, they doubted whether the
stated purpose actually motivated the adoption of the policy.21 The shadows of
doubt were cast by the fact that numerous public school sites were available in
the area.22 In ultimately holding that there was a secular motivation for the
policy, the decision illustrates the ease with which the secular purpose test
may be satisfied.
The primary or principal effect test is the most important part of the
Lemon analysis. Its importance is explained by the close similarity between
15. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1047-48.
16. Id. at 1048.
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18. Id. at 612-13.
19. As long as there is a single secular motive for the policy or legislation, it
should clear the secular purpose hurdle. "The Court has invalidated ... governmental
action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has con-
cluded there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by reli-
gious consideration." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). Justice Scalia has
noted that in the myriad of establishment clause cases decided by the Court, only four
laws have been invalidated "for lack of a secular purpose." Edwards v. Aguillard, 107
S. Ct. 2573, 2593 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The cases were: Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
20. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1049.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court was very likely influenced by the fact that the parochial schools
first approached the University requesting to become student teaching sites, with the
formal policy following. Id. at 1047.
1988]
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the test and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of the estab-
lishment clause. Justice Black's interpretation in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion prominently featured prohibitions against setting up a state church, aiding
one or all religions, and taxing in support of religion.23 Justice Brennan in
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp24 stated that the establishment clause pro-
hibition "was designed comprehensively to prevent those official involvements
of religion which would tend to foster or discourage worship or belief."25 State
policies which "foster or discourage worship or belief" also would necessarily
have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Therefore, merely stating
the primary effect test is to capture the central meaning of the establishment
clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The primary effect test was decisive in Stark. The University policy failed
to satisfy the test because it "impermissibly advance[d] religion by creating a
perception that the state endorse[d] the institutions' religious mission. 126 The
student teaching program was said to foster an appearance of church and state
union that "tends to destroy government and degrade religion. 17 The court
was especially concerned about the effect of the state sponsored student
teacher acting in the pervasively sectarian environment on the minds of im-
pressionable children attending the parochial schools. 28 "By creating the per-
ception in the minds of the parochial school students that the state supports
the religious school and its message, the state thereby promotes the religious
mission" of the school.29
The creation of a perception about church-state relations is not the first
thing which comes to mind when considering impermissible advancement of
religion. Typically, one might expect advancement of religion to take the form
of a tax30 or special use of public institutions31 or personnel3 2 for religious
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
25. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1050 (citing Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 389-92 (1985)).
27. Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
28. Id. at 1051; see also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390(1983) (cited by Stark). Whether the alleged church-state involvement occurs in a
situation involving children or adults will significantly affect the outcome of the case. In
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court upheld a federal statute granting
funding for buildings on college campuses which included schools with a religious asso-
ciation. The Court felt that "[tihe skepticism of the college student" would reduce the
chance of any effective religious indoctrination or creation of the perception that the
state supported the religious mission of the school. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
29. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1051.
30. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Justice Black inter-
preted the establishment clause to preclude a tax in support of religion. See supra text
accompanying note 5.
31. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Court invali-
dated the practice of reading a nondenominational prayer at the opening of the day in
public schools. The Court held, among other things, that this practice had the effect of
[Vol. 53
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purposes. The court in Stark did not make its decision based on the existence
of one of these impermissible substantive relationships, but rather the percep-
tion that such a substantive relationship existed.
The Stark court relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball.33 In Ball, the school district created two
programs for the education, at public expense, of nonpublic school students in
rooms on the campuses of the nonpublic schools." One program involved clas-
ses during the regular school day taught by full-time public employees. The
part time employee almost always was a full-time teacher at the sectarian
school where the class was held.3 5 The school district took precautions to sepa-
rate these state sponsored classes from those given by the sectarian school. The
rooms leased by the school district were stripped of any religious symbols al-
though the hallways giving access to the room could bear religious artifacts
and symbols."6 While the state funded class was conducted, the teacher was
required to post a sign giving notice of the exclusive public control of the class-
room.37 These programs were found to be constitutionally infirm under the
establishment clause. The risk that the full time parochial school employee
would infuse a religious message into the after hours class was believed to be
too great, and it was feared that the full time public employees might succumb
to the pressure to inculcate religion presented by the "environment" of the
pervasively sectarian school.38 Secondly, the Court found the "provision of sec-
ular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings" caused a
"symbolic union" between church and state which conveyed a message of state
support for religion.39 Lastly, the programs subsidized religion by assuming
the parochial school's secular functions, freeing parochial schools' resources
for religious functions.4 0
The second finding is the most relevant to the decision in Stark. In Ball,
Justice Brennan articulated fully for the first time the symbolic union element
of the primary effect test. Brennan explained:
placing the "power, prestige and financial support of government... behind a particu-
lar religious belief." Id. at 431. By using the public institution (here a school) to re-
quire the reading of a certain prayer, religion was impermissibly advanced.
32. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In Meek, counseling, test-
ing and other auxiliary services were provided by the state on parochial school grounds.
These programs involved the presence of publicly supported teachers. The use of these
personnel to foster religion, or even the potential for such "impermissible fostering of
religion," was held unconstitutional. Id. at 372.
33. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
34. Id. at 375.
35. Id. at 375-78.
36. Id. at 378.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 397. Forty of the forty-one schools involved in the programs were
found to be "pervasively sectarian." Id. at 384-85. For an explanation of the perva-
sively sectarian finding, see infra note 72.
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Government promotes religion as effectively ... [as direct funding] ... when
it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of
any - or all - religious denominations .... If this identification conveys a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose
of the Establishment Clause is violated .... It follows that an important con-
cern of the effect test is whether the symbolic union of church and state ef-
fected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be per-
ceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and
by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."1
The court in Stark found a forbidden symbolic union in the University's
policy. Worse than the situation in Ball, where state and parochial school
teachers were merely in the same building at the same time, this program had
state sponsored student teachers and parochial school teachers jointly teaching
the same class., 2 Further, the University's policy left participation by the stu-
dent teacher in any religious events at the school completely to the discretion
of the individual student teacher and the parochial school's personnel. 43 Fi-
nally, as in Ball, there was the danger that the state sponsored teacher would
inadvertently or otherwise "inject religious tenets into their teaching."'4
Therefore, the court concluded that the policy suggested state endorsement of
the schools' religious message. 5
The court of appeals expressly disavowed addressing any of the other
grounds on which the district court based its decision.46 In addition to an im-
41. Id. at 389-90. It is difficult to understand how the symbolic union element of
the primary effect test clarifies the establishment clause analysis. The finding of a sym-
bolic union depends ultimately on the judges' perceptions of others' perceptions of the
message communicated by the challenged state program. These others are not named
in the lawsuit, nor in any way identified. Such a vague element increases the power of
the court to decide the fate of state programs based upon the judges' predilections
about what constitutes good policy, without any evidence of injury to the complaining
party. See id. at 401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting in a related matter the lack of
evidence as to any state sponsorship of religion).
42. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1051. The court was also concerned that the dominant,
supervisory role of the parochial school teacher over the student teacher gave the per-
ception that the state was "actively seeking" the approval of religion. Id. at 1051 n.9.
Keeping in mind that we are talking about the perception of children, it strains credu-
lity to suggest that any but a very few contemplated the symbolic roles of their teacher
as representing religion and the student teacher as representing the state. If there were
any that grasped the symbolism, they were probably intelligent enough to come to their
own conclusions about the proper constitutional relation between church and state
without succumbing to indoctrination by the parochial teacher or the Supreme Court.
43. Id. at 1052.
44. Id. Recall in Ball, the majority separated the danger of state sponsored
teachers inculcating religion from the symbolic union element of the primary effect
test. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39. In Stark, the court expressly consid-
ered this danger with respect to the perception of state endorsement of religion. Stark,
802 F.2d at 1052 n.10.
45. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1052 & n.10.
46. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. The dis-
trict court's opinion is reported at 604 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Minn. 1985).
6
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permissible state endorsement of religion, the district court found that the
University's policy had also advanced religion by:
1) "making it likely that the University students would inculcate religious
beliefs"; 2) failing to "limit the parochial schools' use of state funds"; and
3) causing excessive entanglement between church and state. 7
The decision of the court of appeals is based solely upon the second prong
(primary effect test) of the Lemon analysis. 4 8 Of the three ways in which reli-
gion may be advanced under the primary effect test as articulated in Grand
Rapids v. Ball,4 9 the court did not rely upon the danger of state sponsored
teachers inculcating religion, as an element separate from symbolic union, nor
did it find the state was providing a subsidy by assuming secular functions of
the parochial school.50 The court based its decision solely upon the symbolic
union element.
Although the court of appeals did not consider the third prong of the
Lemon test, the district court found the policy also had the effect of causing
excessive church-state entanglement. 5' The excessive entanglement test was
first articulated as a separate prong of the establishment clause analysis in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 The test scrutinizes the degree of entanglement of reli-
gion with the state necessitated by the challenged state program, with "[t]he
objective . . . to prevent, as far as possible the intrusion of either into the
precincts of the other."53 The district court found the weekly on-site visits by
the student's University supervisor and the lack of control over the University
student's participation in religious events of the school to be evidence of exces-
sive entanglement.5 Interestingly, the court of appeals considered these same
facts to be evidence of the program's having created a symbolic union which
violated the establishment clause because it had the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion.5 5 The excessive entanglement test did not add anything to the
establishment clause analysis of the University's program.5 6 The court also
47. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1052 n.11.
48. See supra note 3.
49. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
50. The dissent, in Stark, saw one of the issues as whether the state was subsi-
dizing the religious mission of the schools. See Stark, 802 F.2d at 1053 (Bowman, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, made only a passing reference to state subsidy as
the basis for its holding. Id. at 1050.
51. Stark v. St. Cloud Univ., 604 F. Supp. 1555, 1563 (D. Minn. 1985), afid,
802 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1986).
52. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
53. Id. at 614. Chief Justice Burger wrote that the "substantial religious charac-
ter" of the church-related schools gave rise to the prohibited entangling relationships.
Id. at 616. If the state employed teachers were to be sufficiently policed so that they
did not, inadvertently or otherwise, inculcate religion in their teaching, too much state
involvement in the precinct of religion would be required. See id. at 619.
54. Stark, 604 F. Supp. at 1563.
55. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1051-52.
56. The excessive entanglement test failed to add to the analysis because the
19881
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demonstrates the "Catch 22" effect of the entanglement test by stating that
had the University taken steps to police the student's involvement in the paro-
chial school's activities, this too would constitute excessive entanglement.57
The Eighth Circuit was not unanimous in its conclusion regarding the
University's student teacher placement policy. The dissent and the majority
succeeded in arguing around each other, each making their points without
squarely addressing the other's argument. The dissent never addressed the
symbolic union finding which was decisive for the majority. 8
The majority and dissenting opinions, examined in juxtaposition, show
how sensitive the result in Stark was to each judge's characterization of the
facts and issues. The majority characterized the issue in terms of the permissi-
bility of aid flowing from the University to the parochial schools, with the
University student being merely an instrument of the state.59 The dissent,
however, viewed the issue as whether the University could provide private
school practice teaching sites as an aid to its students without impermissibly
aiding the parochial schools selected as sites. Accordingly, the dissent found
the Supreme Court opinions in Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for
the Blind0 and Mueller v. Allen61 to be most relevant.6 In Witters, a visually
impaired student studying to be a pastor, missionary or youth director at a
Christian college was denied benefits under a state aid program for the blind.63
same evidence which shows entanglement also shows a primary effect of advancing
religion.
57. Justice White first explained the "Catch-22" effect in Lemon. In that case,
the Court held that the state cannot finance secular instruction in parochial schools if
religion is permitted to be taught in the same classroom, but if a promise not to teach
religion is elicited and enforced then there is an excessive entanglement. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1970) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
58. Judge Bowman, in the dissent, made the somewhat conclusory statement that
"there is nothing in the challenged program to suggest state endorsement of any partic-
ular religious practice or belief or even to suggest a preference for religion over the
absence of religion." Stark, 802 F.2d at 1053 (Bowman, J., dissenting). This author
characterizes the statement as conclusory because the dissent failed to address the
grounds for the majority's finding of symbolic union. Judge Bowman merely stated that
the program made student teachers available to all schools, public or private, and
therefore was neutral as to religion. Id.
59. The majority placed considerable importance on the fact that there were no
restrictions on the students' involvement in any religious activities at the school. Stark,
802 F.2d at 1052. If the students were not assumed to be state actors, this conduct
could not suggest the union of state and church.
60. 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
61. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). In Mueller, the Supreme Court upheld a state taxdeduction for education expenses although a majority of those taking the deduction had
children in sectarian schools. Id. at 401. Significantly, the Court noted that the state
tax deduction, "by channelling whatever assistance it may provide to parochial schools
through individual parents ... reduced the Establishment Clause objections to which
its action is subject." Id. at 399.
62. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1052-53 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
63. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748, 750(1986).
[Vol. 53
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The state supreme court ruled that the denial of the benefits was mandated by
the establishment clause.6 This decision was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.65 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, characterized the
program as a payment to the student, who in turn made an independent choice
to use the funds at a religious institution in pursuit of a religious vocation.6
The vocational aid program was found to create no financial incentive for re-
cipients "to undertake sectarian education."6 The majority never refered to
the holding of Witters, but it apparently distinguished that case by noting that
the student's choice of practice teaching sites was not "purely private."'68 The
University initially selected the eligible sites, and the student's placement at a
parochial school was subject to final approval by the University. 9 There was
nothing to indicate either of these limitations operated to channel students into
the parochial school sites or were not motivated by secular consideration. The
court found the program to have a secular purpose so there was no conclusive
evidence that the decision to select a certain site favored one religion over
another or religion over the absence of religion.7 0 The students were never
required to fulfill their requirements at a parochial school.7 1 The oblique na-
ture of the majority's rebuttal of the applicability of Witters suggests that the
question of whether the aid flows directly to the student and indirectly to the
school or directly to the school is insignificant. However, if the student is an
independent actor, the majority would have to give further justification for the
relevance of Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, in which the teachers in the
parochial schools, as state employees, were clearly agents of the state.
The dissent, while failing to consider the symbolic union basis for the
majority's holding, addressed the issue of other forms of impermissible aid to
the parochial schools.72 The majority devoted almost no ink to any forms of
64. Id.
65. Id. at 751.
66. "In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision...
to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State." Id. at 752.
67. Id.
68. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1051.
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
71. See Stark, 802 F.2d at 1047.
72. Generally, a court is more likely to find that a state program impermissibly
aids the sectarian school or other religious institution if the institution is found to be
pervasively sectarian. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted that the very nature of some religious institutions gives rise to imper-
missible entangling relationships between the church and state). Typically, in cases
involving parochial schools, the court will consider statements in literature about the
school suggesting that the religious mission of the school saturates all elements of the
education, the amount of time devoted to religious instruction and other factors tending
to show the pervasiveness of religion in all school functions. See id. at 615-18. The
significance of finding such "pervasiveness of religion" is that the secular and religious
aspects of a particular institution are so intertwined that no matter what seemingly
secular function is aided by the state, it necessarily involves the government in the
"essentially religious activities" of the institution. See id. at 657-58 (Brennan, J., con-
1988]
9
James: James: Symbolic Union
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW[
aid to the schools other than the creation of a symbolic union. However, the
majority suggested that the program aided the parochial schools by giving
them the opportunity to evaluate students placed there for future employment
and by giving funds to the schools with "no strings attached.""73
The dissent characterized the operation of the program as a transaction
between the University and the parochial schools. The school took on the bur-
den of training the student teacher, and in return the University made a "to-
ken" payment of $96. 74 The majority implicitly rejected the characterization
offered by the dissent. The benefit of the payment was separated from the
burden, shouldered by the schools, of turning the novice student teacher into a
professional. 75 Separation of the burden and benefit in the text of the majority
opinion would not be noteworthy except for the fact that the majority viewed
the burden as another benefit to the school. By placing the significant responsi-
bility of training the student teachers the state designated the parochial
schools as "repositories of the state trust.176 This designation communicated a
message of state endorsement of the schools and their religious messages.7
The dissent and majority again passed like two ships in the night. The
majority apparently rejected the transaction characterization of the program
given by the dissent, but failed to give a principled argument. The significance
of characterizing the interaction of the University and the parochial schools as
a transaction is that although benefits are received by the schools, they are
cancelled out by corresponding burdens taken on by the schools. The question
of whether a religious institution may receive benefits from the state when it
performs services for the state without violating the establishment clause has
not been passed upon by the Supreme Court.
Whether the decision in Stark will be followed in other circuits, or ulti-
mately by the Supreme Court, is difficult to predict because it depends not so
much upon the large body of establishment clause precedents as it does on
each court's characterization of the facts. Possibly the most important factual
conclusion, which was almost completely ignored by both the majority and the
dissent in Stark, is whether the student is a state actor. A university student is
clearly not a state employee as were the public school teachers in Grand
Rapids v. Ball. It is also true that the student attends a university subsidized
by the state, but to state that fact is not to prove that a university student is a
state actor in the same way as a state employee. Inasmuch as the student is an
independent actor, the precedent of Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services
seems to apply. However, it remains to be seen as to whether Witters opened
curring). The significance of the pervasively sectarian finding in Stark is that even if
the student teachers were solely involved in secular functions, religion could still be
benefited. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1050.
73. Stark, 802 F.2d at 1050.
74. Id. at 1053.
75. See id. at 1050.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1050-51.
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other than the narrowest exception when state aid flows to religious institu-
tions through private actors. Clearly, the parochial schools and the University
in Stark had a relationship which was independent of the student.
The other important characterization involves transactions between the
state and religious institutions. The implication of the majority opinion in
Stark is that when state funds or other support flow to the religious institution,
they must be characterized as aid even if the institution performs services in
return. A future court may decide that where church and state interaction are
involved the establishment clause does not allow a court to look at a net result,
but must focus exclusively on the state funds and support.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a student teaching program
at a state university which used sectarian schools as teaching sites'that could
survive the Lemon analysis as performed in Stark. Consider the facets of the
program which the Eighth Circuit found objectionable. First, and apparently
most egregious, is the fact that the students made their own decision regarding
participation in any religious activities at the school. 8 Additionally, the stu-
dent and the parochial school teacher co-taught the class, and the university
supervisor appeared regularly, interacting with both the teacher and the stu-
dent.79 These two facts tended to establish a symbolic union between the state
and religion.80 Finally, an underlying element in the decision is the concept
that state involvement with pervasively sectarian institutions inherently creates
a perception of state endorsement of the institution's religious message.81
Therefore, while it is possible to prohibit the student's involvement in religious
activities, any student teaching program will require close interaction between
the parochial school teacher and the student. If this interaction must necessa-
rily create a symbolic union, then pervasively sectarian schools can never be
student teaching sites.82
The court's application of the symbolic union element has significance be-
yond the facts in Stark. The Stark decision illustrates the potential power the
symbolic union element has in establishment clause cases as a tool for federal
78. See id. at 1052. Participation in any religious activity would show the state
has "affirmatively undertaken the instruction" of religious views associated with the
activity. Id.
79. Id. at 1051.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1050. "Given that the parochial schools serving as student teaching
sites are pervasively sectarian, we are forced to conclude that the University's policy
impermissibly advances religion ... ." Id. This statement which appears early in the
opinion is not an island unto itself. The remainder of the opinion explains and supports
this statement, including prominent references to the facts.
82. It would, however, be foolish to make any absolute statements regarding the
permissibility of utilizing pervasively sectarian schools as student teaching sites. The
law is subject to sudden shifts and variations. Compare McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203. (1948) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). For instance, no
one can determine what effect the Court's doubting of the University's secular purpose
may have had on the application of the other two prongs of the test.
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review of state action. Its power stems from the fact that no proof of substan-
tive aid need be made in order to invoke the symbolic union finding. Indeed, it
does not require that there actually be any aid at all, but rather only that the
challenged program is "sufficiently likely" to be perceived as a message of
endorsement of religion. 3 It is difficult to predict just when an unspoken or
unwritten message is communicated by the nature or operation of a state
program.
The evolutionary nature of legal principles announced in caselaw seems
patently obvious. A legal system which relies on precedent naturally invites
change as new factual situations are confronted. Judges of the highest courts
are free to ignore the caselaw principles they create. However, it is a written
constitution being interpreted where establishment clause questions are in-
volved. New legal principles created to aid constitutional interpretation cannot
be justified on the basis of caselaw precedent, but must be squared with the
Constitution itself.8 ' Therefore, before the symbolic union element is accepted
as the sole basis of an establishment clause decision, the courts should evaluate
whether the first amendment requires that the state refrain from actions creat-
ing the perception that it endorses religion.
KURT F. JAMES
83. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985). The signifi-
cance of Stark is that unlike Ball, the decision was based solely on the symbolic union
element. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
84. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 389-90. In Ball, Justice Brennan began his explanation
of symbolic union with, "Our cases have recognized the Establishment Clause guards
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